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Termination of a minor’s pregnancy: critical issues for 
consent and the criminal law 
 
The recent Supreme Court decision of State of Queensland v B has significant 
implications for the law that governs consent and abortions.  The judgment purports 
to extend the ratio of Marion’s case and impose a requirement of court approval for 
terminations of pregnancy for minors who are not Gillick competent.  This article 
argues against the imposition of this requirement on the ground that such an 
approach is an unjustifiable extension of the reasoning in Marion’s case.  The 
decision, which is the first judicial consideration of the position of medical 
terminations, also reveals systemic problems with the criminal law in Queensland.  In 
concluding that the traditional legal excuse for abortions will not apply to those 
which are performed medically, State of Queensland v B provides further support for 
calls to reform this area of law.  
 
Ben White and Lindy Willmott 
Introduction 
  
Late last year, in State of Queensland v B,1 the Supreme Court of Queensland 
considered an application in its parens patriae jurisdiction from a hospital to authorise 
the termination of a pregnancy of a 12 year old girl, B.  Because the girl was almost 
18 weeks pregnant, the proposed method of termination was through the 
administration of a drug, misoprostol, rather than a surgical procedure.  The girl 
wanted the termination to go ahead as did both of her parents.  This was also the 
course of action proposed by the hospital.  Justice Wilson of the Supreme Court 
concluded that ‘the continuation of B’s pregnancy would pose serious danger to her 
mental health and well-being, beyond the normal dangers of pregnancy and 
childbirth’.2  Her Honour declared that the termination of the pregnancy by the 
‘administration of the drug misoprostol would be reasonable in all the circumstances 
to avoid danger to the child’s mental health’.  Declarations were also made permitting 
the child to undergo the termination and for hospital staff to perform it.3 
 
There were two major aspects to this decision, each of which raises significant legal 
issues that go well beyond the scope of the present case. The first is the issue of 
consent. In State of Queensland v B, Wilson J concluded that the girl did not have a 
full understanding of the nature of the proposed termination on the basis of evidence 
given by the girl’s father, an obstetrician and a psychiatrist.4  Accordingly, she was 
not able to give consent for herself.  However, Her Honour also concluded that this 
consent could not be given by her parents either: such a decision to terminate a 
pregnancy falls outside the scope of parental authority and therefore can only be made 
by a court.  In doing reaching this view, Wilson J extended the ratio of Secretary, 
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Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB and SMB5 (Marion’s 
case) to decisions to terminate the pregnancy of minors who are not yet Gillick 
competent.6  The implications of extending the ratio of Marion’s case are significant 
and this article seeks to argue that such a position should not be adopted.  
 
The second major aspect of the decision in State of Queensland v B was whether the 
termination was lawful.  Of significance here was that Wilson J concluded that the 
provision of the Criminal Code (Qld) traditionally relied upon as an excuse for 
termination of pregnancies (section 282) did not apply.7  That provision refers only to 
‘surgical operations’ and so would not excuse terminations undertaken medically 
through the administration of drugs.  With that excuse unavailable, Wilson J relied on 
section 286, which imposes on a ‘person who has care of a child under 16 years’ a 
duty to: 
 
… 
(b)  take the precautions that are reasonable in all the circumstances to avoid danger to the 
child's life, health or safety; and  
(c)  take the action that is reasonable in all the circumstances to remove the child from any 
such danger 
… 
 
Wilson J concluded that the administration of the drug would be reasonable within the 
meaning of this provision and so the existence of this duty meant that the termination 
of pregnancy would not be unlawful.   
 
This decision raises issues for the criminal law governing abortion.  This is the first 
time that the position of medical terminations has been judicially considered in 
Queensland.  The conclusion that the traditional excuse that is relied on for 
terminations does not apply in this context raises issues about the lawfulness of these 
procedures.  The decision also reveals some inconsistencies in how the criminal law 
deals with termination of pregnancies for minors.   
 
Although only a short judgment, State of Queensland v B has significant implications 
for two critical areas of medical law: consent and abortion.  This article critically 
examines these two aspects of the judgment before making observations on how the 
problems identified should be addressed. 
 
Extending Marion’s case to terminations of pregnancy 
 
The authors argue that the ratio of Marion’s case should not be extended to the 
termination of a pregnancy for a non-Gillick competent minor.  To make this 
argument, it is necessary to recap briefly on the facts of that case, together with the 
reasoning of the majority, as revealed in their joint judgment, and of the three Justices 
who gave separate dissenting judgments.   
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Marion’s case involved a 14 year old girl with an intellectual disability who was 
severely deaf, suffered from epilepsy, had an ataxic gait and exhibited behavioural 
problems.  Marion’s parents wanted her to be sterilised and the issue was whether that 
decision was within the power of her parents to make.  The sterilisation was ‘non-
therapeutic’ which means that it was not needed to treat some malfunction or disease, 
but rather it was necessary to enhance Marion’s quality of life.  The parents wanted 
the procedures (hysterectomy and an ovariectomy) to occur to prevent ‘pregnancy and 
menstruation with its psychological and behavioural consequences’.8  The High Court 
held that the parents did not have power to consent to such treatment, and court 
authorisation was required for the procedure to be lawful. 
 
The decision was by majority, with Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ 
delivering a joint judgment.  The majority considered that the sterilisation procedure 
was a ‘special case’ requiring court authorisation for two major reasons.  First, 
because of the ‘significant risk of making the wrong decision, either as to a child’s 
present or future capacity to consent or about what are the best interests of a child 
who cannot consent’.9  The Justices described the three factors that they considered 
contributed to the significant risk of a wrong decision as follows: 
1. The complexity of the question of consent – Here, the Justices referred to the 
fact that a person may make an incorrect assessment that the child does not 
have the ability to consent.  They also referred to the fact that historically, 
incorrect assumptions were made about the inability of a child with a disability 
to consent to, or refuse, such a procedure. 
2. The medical profession often plays a crucial role in the decision to sterilise as 
well as the procedure itself – The concerns of the Justices were that health 
professionals do not always make appropriate decisions.  Further, there are 
many aspects of a sterilisation decision that are not of a medical nature, so are 
outside the expertise of the medical profession. 
3. There may be conflicting factors in making a decision – The decision to 
sterilise involves not only the interests of the child but also possibly 
conflicting interests of the parents and other family members. 
 
Secondly, the consequences of making a wrong decision are particularly grave.  The 
consequences referred to by the majority were both the inability to reproduce, and the 
fact of being acted upon contrary to the child’s best interests. 
 
The other three Justices dissented, but all for different reasons.  Justice Brennan was 
of the view that the courts could not have any wider power to consent to a medical 
procedure than the parents.  Further, his Honour was of the view that it was beyond 
the power of both parents and the court to consent to a non-therapeutic sterilisation. 
Justice Deane took a different approach.  He was of the view that a parent could 
consent to a sterilisation procedure, including a non-therapeutic procedure, if it were 
‘so obviously in the interests of the welfare of such a child’.10  Court approval would 
only be necessary if the need for the procedure was not obvious.  Finally, McHugh J 
was of the view that parents could consent to such a procedure if it were in the best 
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interests of the child.11  His Honour did add the caveat that the power to consent 
should be exercised by the court if the interests of the parents conflicted with those of 
the child.12 
 
There are two preliminary comments that should be made about the High Court 
judgments which are relevant to the issue considered in this article, namely whether 
the ratio of Marion’s case should be extended to the termination of a pregnancy of a 
non-Gillick competent minor.  First, there were four different approaches taken by 
seven High Court Justices.  This fact alone demonstrates the complexity and difficulty 
of the issues considered by the Court.  Secondly, there was a clear reluctance by all 
members of the Court to take matters out of the ambit of parental responsibility.  The 
majority held that it would only be in an exceptional (or ‘special’) case, that such a 
step would be taken.  Justices Deane and McHugh held that, in an appropriate case, 
parents would have such a power, while Brennan J was of the view that courts could 
not have greater powers to consent to treatment than parents. 
 
It is against this backdrop that Wilson J extended the ratio of Marion’s case to a 
decision about termination of a minor’s pregnancy.  The authors advance three 
arguments as to why such an extension is not justifiable.13 
 
1.  Critical distinctions between the procedures of termination and non-
therapeutic sterilisation 
 
The justification for extending Marion’s case to decisions about terminating a 
pregnancy was contained in one paragraph of Wilson J’s judgment.  Because of the 
legal and practical significance of this decision, it is worth setting out that reasoning 
in full: 
 
In Marion's case, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ discussed why 
the parents of an intellectually disabled girl could not validly consent to her 
sterilisation, essentially because of the risks of their making the wrong 
decision and the grave consequences of their doing so. For similar reasons, B’s 
parents should not be able to consent to the termination of her pregnancy. The 
Court in its role as parens patriae must act in the best interests of the child, B, 
whereas her parents may ultimately make a decision which favours other and 
possibly conflicting interests of the family as a whole (albeit one bifurcated by 
their own divorce). And, like the decision to sterilise, which was under 
consideration in Marion’s case, the medical profession might be expected to 
play a central role in the decision to terminate the pregnancy as well as in the 
procedure itself. To terminate a pregnancy is to negate the possibility of the 
mother ultimately giving birth to a live baby [emphasis (underlining) added]. 
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The thrust of Wilson J’s reasoning is that the two factors which were relied upon by 
the majority in the High Court in deciding that a non-therapeutic sterilisation was a 
‘special case’ applied equally to a termination: to use the summary of Wilson J, 
‘because of the risks of their making the wrong decision and the grave consequences 
of their doing so’.  The difficulty with the Supreme Court decision is that it did not 
engage in any detail about how these two factors apply to the case of a termination.  
The authors consider there are some critical distinctions that mean terminations and 
non-therapeutic sterilisations should be treated differently. 
 
First limb: risks of making the wrong decision 
 
Regarding the risks of making the wrong decision, the only justification or 
explanation in the relevant paragraph of Wilson J’s judgment was that there was 
potential conflict between the interests of the family and of the child, and that the 
medical profession would play a role in the decision-making and in the procedure 
itself.  With respect, this comparison is too simplistic.  There are many types of 
medical treatment that satisfies both of these conditions.  The decision for a minor to 
be prescribed oral contraception is one example.  Parents may wish this to occur 
because they do not want their child to become pregnant and they, the parents, do not 
want the responsibility of raising the child’s baby.  However, to be prescribed an oral 
contraceptive from an early age may not medically be in the child’s best interest.  As 
such, the interests of the parents may conflict with those of the minor.  On the other 
hand, it is also possible that the parents may wish their child to take oral contraception 
for a legitimate medical reason, such as managing difficult and painful menstruation.  
In the latter situation, a conflict of interest does not arise. However, depending on the 
parent’s motives in a particular case, there is clearly a potential for conflict.   
 
Similarly, the health professional is likely to be involved in the decision-making 
process about whether to prescribe oral contraception.  He or she would provide 
medical (and possibly other) opinion about treatment options, and would ultimately 
prescribe the medication if that were the decision taken.   
 
It is submitted that these two factors should not be sufficient to make the prescription 
of oral contraception a ‘special case’ requiring court approval.  Yet, applying the 
reasoning adopted in State of Queensland v B, that may be the result. 
 
Importantly, in considering the risks of making the wrong decision, Wilson J did not 
refer at all to the risk of wrongly assessing either the child’s present or future capacity 
to consent, or the child’s best interests.  It is submitted that both of these issues were 
extremely important to the conclusion of the High Court that a non-therapeutic 
sterilisation was a special case.  Furthermore, these considerations demonstrate the 
significant difference between a non-therapeutic sterilisation and a termination.  A 
determination of the ability of the child to consent now or in the future is a much 
more complex issue for a sterilisation than for a termination.  In relation to the ability 
of the child to consent to a termination, an assessment of the child’s capacity now is 
all that is relevant.  Unlike a sterilisation, which could be carried out at some time in 
the future, there does not need to be an assessment of whether additional age or 
maturity will enable the child to make the decision herself in the future. Also, the 
factors that need to be understood in providing consent are much more straight-
 
 
forward for a termination than for a sterilisation.  For the latter procedure, there are a 
wider number of choices of treatment and different consequences of the different 
sterilisation options. 
 
In terms of the best interests of a child who cannot consent, again it is submitted that a 
decision about termination of pregnancy is much simpler than one about sterilisation.  
For a termination, the options are fewer – either it occurs or it does not (although 
there is generally some choice regarding how a termination is achieved). By contrast, 
a decision as to whether or not a non-therapeutic sterilisation is in a child’s best 
interests involves consideration of a greater number of factors.  Those factors include 
the extent to which alternative options have been attempted or could still be 
attempted.  A full investigation of such matters (including any potential side-effects of 
alternative treatment) will generally be necessary before a court will consider 
approving a non-therapeutic sterilisation.  The factors to consider for a sterilisation 
also include the various possible surgical operations available and the critical issue of 
the timing of any such procedure.14  As a result, issues of whether to sterilise, when to 
sterilise and how to sterilise, make the assessment of a child’s best interests more 
complex than for a termination of pregnancy.    
 
In summary, the authors are of the view that the risks of making the wrong decision 
about a minor’s ability to consent and what is in a minor’s best interests are far greater 
for a non-therapeutic sterilisation than for a termination.  It is therefore argued that the 
ratio of Marion’s case should not be extended to terminations, particularly having 
regard to the otherwise strict approach taken to limiting parental power (see below). 
 
Second limb: gravity of consequences of a wrong decision 
 
The second factor relevant to making non-therapeutic sterilisation a ‘special case’ for 
the majority of the High Court was the gravity of the consequences of making the 
wrong decision.  The gravity of the decision for both a termination and a non-
therapeutic sterilisation is obvious.  However, it is submitted that the consequences of 
sterilisation are far graver for the child than the consequences of an abortion.  
Sterilisation means that the child can never reproduce.  A termination of pregnancy 
means that the child will not reproduce now.  The procedure is unlikely to affect her 
ability to reproduce in the future.  Justice Wilson did not engage in this distinction and 
commented only that ‘to terminate a pregnancy is to negate the possibility of the 
mother ultimately giving birth to a live baby’.15 
 
2.  A strict approach to further incursion into parental powers 
 
It was noted above that all members of the High Court in Marion’s case took a strict 
approach to when parents will not have the power to consent to medical treatment on 
behalf of their child.16 The dissenting three High Court Justices were reluctant to 
allow a court to take over traditional consent power from parents. Justices Deane and 
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McHugh considered that, in an appropriate case, the power to consent to a non-
therapeutic sterilisation should form part of parental powers, and parents should be 
authorised to make decisions that are in their child’s best interests.  Justice Brennan, 
although deciding that neither a court nor a parent should be able to consent to a non-
therapeutic sterilisation, expressed concern about the notion that a court could have 
wider consent powers than a parent.17  It was also clear from the lengthy and 
considered judgment of the majority that incursion into parental power should occur 
only in a ‘special case’.  The majority was at pains to point out what makes non-
therapeutic sterilisation such a case.  It should also be observed that, in no part of their 
judgment, did the majority suggest that the termination of a pregnancy would 
constitute a ‘special case’.18 
 
The limitations on parental consent powers that were imposed by the High Court in 
Marion’s case have subsequently been invoked, but only on a handful of occasions.  
In Re A (a child),19 the Family Court held that gender reassignment was a ‘special 
case’ within the ambit described in Marion’s case for which court approval was 
required.20  The same position was taken by the Family Court some years later in Re 
Alex (Hormonal Treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria),21 a case in which the 
court approved hormonal treatment being administered to a 13 year old girl who was 
diagnosed with gender identity disorder or gender identity dysphoria.22   
 
As a result of two decisions of the Family Court, there is some doubt as to whether 
court approval is required in the case of the donation of regenerative tissue by a non-
Gillick competent child to a sick relative.  While in GWW and CMW,23 the Family 
Court indicated that court approval was required, the more recent decision of Re Inaya 
(Special Medical Procedure)24 held that such a procedure fell within the ordinary 
parental power.  In the later decision, the Family Court noted the observation of the 
High Court in Marion’s case that most decisions about medical treatment fell within 
normal parental responsibility.25  Cronin J also referred to the cost and inconvenience 
of having to apply for court approval, factors also acknowledged by the High Court.26 
 
It is submitted that courts should be, and have been, slow to limit the power of parents 
to act in their child’s best interests.  This sentiment permeates all of the judgments in 
                                                 
17 (1991) 175 CLR 218, 282. 
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in relation to a termination of pregnancy (as well as sterilisation) and if it did, then there would be no 
parental power to consent and court approval would be required: (1991) 175 CLR 218, 317, 322.  
However, these comments were made in the context of His Honour declining to mandate court 
approval for sterilisations and expressly recognising parental power to provide consent to all medical 
treatment in a child’s best interests: 321-322. 
19 (1993) 16 Fam LR 715. 
20 The application in this case was for the assignment of male sex organs to the child.  The court 
authorised the child’s mother to consent to a range of medical procedures including bilateral 
mastectomies, hysterectomy and oophorectomy, unfolding of the clitoris, closure of the labia to create 
the appearance of a scrotum, the insertion of prosthetic testes and other consequential treatment. 
21 (2004) 180 FLR 89. 
22 This treatment has irreversible consequences including deepening of the voice, promotion of facial 
and body hair, encouragement of muscular development and the enlargement of the clitoris.   
23 (1997) 21 Fam LR 612. 
24 (2007) 38 Fam LR 546. 
25 (2007) 38 Fam LR 546, [60]. 
26 (2007) 38 Fam LR 546, [61]. 
 
 
Marion’s case, and is evident from the limited extension of what constitutes a ‘special 
case’ in the 17 years since the landmark decision of the High Court.  A decision to 
terminate a pregnancy for a child who lacks capacity is a serious one, and should be 
made only if it accords with the child’s best interests.  However, when assessing the 
nature of the surgery, it must be questioned whether the medical procedure is 
comparable with non-therapeutic sterilisation, gender reassignment surgery and 
treatment for gender identity dysphoria. With respect to Wilson J, compelling reasons 
were not advanced in State of Queensland v B as to why a termination of pregnancy 
should be regarded as a ‘special case’ that falls outside the ordinary power of parents 
to consent in their child’s best interests. 
 
3.  Parental power to consent in relation to more significant medical decisions 
 
The decision to require court approval for the termination of pregnancy does not sit 
comfortably with other powers of parents to make medical decisions that are in the 
best interests of their child.27  The decision to withhold and withdraw life-sustaining 
medical treatment from non-Gillick competent children is an obvious example.  Such 
decisions, though tragic, are not uncommon in the case of babies who are born with 
very serious disabilities and for whom the provision of medical treatment is 
considered to be futile.  The common law has recognised that these decisions to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment can be made by parents without the 
need for court approval, even though such a decision would result in the child’s 
death.28  Court intervention is generally required only when disagreement arises 
between parents and the child’s medical team as to what is in the child’s best 
interests.29  
 
A decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment is, in some respects, 
similar to a decision to terminate a pregnancy: there is potential for conflict between 
the interests of the baby and the family (as the family may have to make sacrifices in 
order to raise the baby who suffers from profound disabilities); the decision to 
withhold or withdraw treatment will involve medical professionals; and the 
consequence of the decision not to provide treatment is extremely grave, namely the 
death of the baby.  These were the factors that Wilson J relied upon in State of 
Queensland v B to justify the requirement for court approval. Yet, despite sharing 
these features, the courts have recognised that parents do have power to refuse 
consent to life-sustaining medical treatment.30  It seems incongruous to require court 
approval for a decision to terminate a pregnancy of a child, yet not to require it for a 
decision that will result in the child’s death. 
                                                 
27 The power of a parent to consent to (or refuse) treatment for their child stems from their ‘parental 
responsibility’: see ss 61C(1) and 61B Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).  Note, however, that there are legal 
avenues that are available to protect a child if a parent exercises his or her power in a manner that is not 
in the child’s best interests: see further Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice: Rights, duties, claims 
and defences (3rd ed, 2008) 4.7-4.14. 
28 Wyatt v Portsmouth Hospital NHS [2005] 1 WLR 3395, [3]. 
29 See, for example, Wyatt v Portsmouth Hospital NHS [2005] 1 WLR 3395; An NHS Trust v MB 
[2006] EWHC 507 (Fam); Re K (A Minor) [2006] EWHC 1007 (Fam); Re OT (A child) [2009] EWCA 
Civ 409.  For a general consideration of decisions in New Zealand and some other overseas 
jurisdictions concerning the ability of parents to refuse treatment on behalf of their non-Gillick 
competent children, see Joanna Manning in ‘Parental refusal of life-prolonging medical treatment for 
children: a report from New Zealand’ (2001) 8 Journal of Law and Medicine 263. 
30 Wyatt v Portsmouth Hospital NHS [2005] 1 WLR 3395, [3]. 
 
 
 
 
Implications for the criminal law 
 
State of Queensland v B also has significant implications for the criminal law on 
terminations.  This article will examine the impact of this decision on surgical 
terminations involving children and also the law in relation to medical (rather than 
surgical) abortions.  First, however, the law governing terminations in Queensland is 
outlined. 
 
1.  Criminal law on terminations in Queensland 
 
In Queensland, the termination of pregnancy is governed by the Criminal Code (Qld).  
It is an offence to procure the miscarriage of a woman (section 224), including by the 
woman who is pregnant (section 225),31 and to supply drugs or instruments to procure 
the abortion (section 226).  Section 224 is the principal offence and provides as 
follows: 
Any person who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman, whether 
she is or is not with child, unlawfully administers to her or causes her to take 
any poison or other noxious thing, or uses any force of any kind, or uses any 
other means whatever, is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for 
14 years.  
Despite not originally being designed to provide an excuse in relation to termination 
of pregnancies,32 section 282 of the Criminal Code (Qld) is the provision principally 
relied upon to avoid criminal responsibility.  It provides:  
A person is not criminally responsible for performing in good faith and with 
reasonable care and skill a surgical operation upon any person for the patient's 
benefit, or upon an unborn child for the preservation of the mother's life, if the 
performance of the operation is reasonable, having regard to the patient's state 
at the time and to all circumstances of the case.  
For the Crown to secure a conviction, it would need to negative beyond reasonable 
doubt one of the elements of this excuse and most relevantly for this circumstance 
would need to show either that:  
 the termination was not performed ‘for the preservation of the mother’s life’; or 
 the termination was not ‘reasonable having regard to the patient’s state at the time 
and to all the circumstances of the case.’ 
 
Interestingly, the interpretation of this Code provision has been heavily influenced by 
the common law.  In the Victorian decision of R v Davidson,33 the relevant offence 
                                                 
31 See the recent prosecution of a 19 year old woman for procuring her own abortion after importing the 
drug Misoprostol into Australia from the Ukraine: The Law Report, ‘Queensland abortion prosecution’, 
ABC Radio National, 28 April 2009. 
32 Section 282 was intended to be a defence to the offence of child destruction under section 313: RS 
O’Regan, ‘Surgery and Criminal Responsibility under the Queensland Criminal Code’ (1990) 14 
Criminal Law Journal 73, 77. This was also noted by McGuire DCJ in R v Bayliss and Cullen (1986) 6 
Queensland Lawyer Reports 8, 34-35. 
 
 
provision considered was contravened only if the termination of pregnancy was 
‘unlawful’.  It was therefore argued that not all terminations would be unlawful and 
the common law defence of necessity was identified as a source for making a 
termination lawful.  This was captured in what became known as the ‘Menhennitt 
ruling’ (which was the name of the judge in this case) that a termination will be 
unlawful where it can be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not 
honestly believe on reasonable grounds that: 
 the act was necessary to preserve the woman from a serious danger to her life or 
her physical or mental health (not being merely the normal dangers of pregnancy 
and childbirth) which the continuance of her pregnancy would entail; or  
 in the circumstances, the act was not out of proportion to the danger to be 
averted. 
 
Despite the different wording of section 282, it appears that the Davidson test has 
been accepted as the law in Queensland.34  There have been a series of Supreme Court 
decisions that have accepted this view35 and it was also the basis upon which the 
District Court trials in R v Bayliss and Cullen were held.36  It is noted that the 
common law test as expressed in R v Davidson has been subsequently liberalised and 
it is suggested that this should also be reflected in the law of Queensland.37 
 
2.  Surgical terminations and children 
 
State of Queensland v B involved a termination for a child who was 12 years old and 
not Gillick competent.38  It is worth considering, however, the implications of this 
decision for children more generally in the context of surgical terminations.  It is 
noted at this stage that medical terminations will not be considered here: they are 
examined below.  Children can be placed into four categories for the purpose of this 
discussion:39 
 those under 16 who are not Gillick competent; 
 those under 16 who are Gillick competent; 
                                                                                                                                            
33 [1969] VR 667. 
34 Compare RS O’Regan, ‘Surgery and Criminal Responsibility under the Queensland Criminal Code’ 
(1990) 14 Criminal Law Journal 73, 80-81. O’Regan considers that ‘resort to common law principles 
to supplement and explain statute law … must be regarded as very unusual in Queensland, which has a 
comprehensive Criminal Code, and one which does not have common law defences’: 81. He considers 
that in Queensland it should be section 282, perhaps in combination with section 24 (honest and 
reasonable mistake of fact), that renders abortion lawful: 81. 
35 K v T [1983] 1 Qd R 396, 398 (affirmed on appeal in Attorney-General (ex rel Kerr) v T [1983] 1 Qd 
R 404 and Attorney-General (Qld) (ex rel Kerr) v T (1983) 46 ALR 275, although neither appeal court 
expressed a settled view on the interpretation of Queensland’s abortion law); Re Bayliss (unreported, 
Supreme Court of Queensland, McPherson J, 24 May 1985); Veivers v Connolly [1995] 2 Qd R 326, 
329. 
36 R v Bayliss and Cullen (1986) 6 Queensland Lawyer Reports 8. 
37 N Dixon, Abortion Law Reform: An Overview of Current Issues, Queensland Parliamentary Library 
paper, Research Brief No 2003/09 (2003).  Note also the comments of de Jersey CJ in Veivers v 
Connolly [1995] 2 Qd R 326, 329, which suggest that a wider approach should also be taken in 
Queensland. 
38 For a discussion of Gillick competence, see above n 6. 
39 A child is an individual under 18: Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld).  Once a child turns 18, if she 
lacks capacity to make a decision about terminations, that decision would then fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Guardianship and Administration Tribunal: Guardianship and Administration Act 
2000 (Qld) ss 65, 68, 71, 82(1)(g) and Sch 2 (definition of ‘special health matter’ and ‘special health 
care’). 
 
 
 those over 16 who are not Gillick competent; and 
 those over 16 who are Gillick competent. 
 
Turning first to a termination for a child who is under 16 and who is not Gillick 
competent, if State of Queensland v B represents the law, approval of the court that 
the operation is in her best interests is required.  Justice Wilson also held that the 
court would need to be satisfied that the decision was lawful because it could not be in 
a child’s best interests to be subject to a criminal act and because the Court could not 
authorise what would otherwise be criminal conduct.40  As noted above, in the case of 
State of Queensland v B, Wilson J relied on section 286 of the Criminal Code (Qld) to 
conclude the termination would be lawful. That provision imposes a duty on a ‘person 
who has care of a child under 16 years’ to safeguard that child from danger to her life, 
health or safety. 
 
Although in that case, section 282 was not applicable because it did not involve a 
surgical operation (this is discussed below), in situations involving surgical 
terminations it may also be available to the court.  If so, section 282 presents an 
alternative basis upon which a court could find that a termination was lawful.  The 
result of this analysis is that consideration of whether a surgical termination may 
occur for a child who is under 16 and not Gillick competent potentially involves the 
consideration of three different tests: 
 the child’s best interests (which is the criterion for obtaining court approval); 
 lawfulness under section 286 if the termination is reasonable in all the 
circumstances to avoid danger to the child’s life, health or safety; and 
 lawfulness under section 282 if the termination is necessary to preserve the child 
from a serious danger to her life or her physical or mental health which the 
continuance of her pregnancy would entail, and that the termination is not out of 
proportion to the danger to be averted. 
 
A similar position arises in relation to a child under 16 who is Gillick competent, 
except that the requirement for the court to provide consent on behalf of the child in 
her best interests does not arise. 
 
In relation to a child who is over 16 and Gillick competent, consent from the court is 
also not required and section 282 will be available.  However, section 286 is not as its 
terms are limited to a duty imposed on those with the care of a child under 16.  A 
termination for a child over 16 who is not Gillick competent would also be limited to 
section 282 (and not 286), and it would also require court consent on the basis of the 
child’s best interests. 
 
This analysis reveals the following anomalous situation for surgical terminations 
involving children as set out in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
 
Child’s characteristics Under 16 
 
16 to 18 
 
Lacks competence  Consent: from court in  Consent: from court in 
                                                 
40 [2008] QSC 231, [19]. 
 
 
 best interests 
 Lawful: section 282 or 
section 286 
best interests 
 Lawful: section 282 
only 
Has competence 
 
 Consent: from child 
 Lawful: section 282 or 
section 286 
 Consent: from child 
 Lawful: section 282 
only 
 
The current state of the law is clearly problematic.  This complexity presents 
problems not only for lawyers but also the child involved and her family as well as the 
doctors considering undertaking such procedures.  It is also undesirable for the 
lawfulness of the same procedure in relation to children to be governed by different 
tests.  For example, at least in relation to how the tests are actually worded, it is 
submitted that lawfulness under section 286 will be more easily met than the relevant 
test under section 282.  Under section 286, all that is required is that the termination 
be reasonable to avoid danger whereas section 282 refers to a necessity to preserve the 
child from serious danger provided such action is proportionate.  
 
A further anomaly in the criminal law governing terminations arises from the 
requirement proposed in State of Queensland v B that the court must sanction such a 
decision due to a lack of parental power.  In sterilisations, a failure to get the court’s 
consent will mean that any operation will be an assault, making those responsible 
liable under both criminal and civil law.41  The position for terminations is different.  
A lack of the judicial consent required in State of Queensland v B will certainly lead 
to civil liability for the tort of assault, but it may not lead to criminal liability.  If the 
termination occurs in circumstances in which section 282 would apply, the excuse 
means that a person is ‘not criminally responsible’.  Where this leaves the requirement 
of court approval so far as it is supported by effective sanctions is unclear.  It certainly 
seems odd that a failure to obtain court approval could result in civil action but that 
doctors and others could at the same time be protected from criminal liability despite 
that failure to follow the mandated court approval process.   
 
This situation could also arise in relation to terminations regarded as lawful through 
the operation of section 286.  It is noted that that section is a duty provision and does 
not refer to a person being excused from ‘criminal responsibility’.  Nevertheless, that 
obligation to safeguard a child from danger is being relied upon in this context to 
excuse criminal liability and so the same anomalous situation could arise.  
 
3.  Medical (rather than surgical) terminations 
 
While section 282 may have application to termination of pregnancies done by way of 
surgical operation, it will not apply to excuse medical terminations.  The provision 
refers only to ‘surgical operations’ and would not include the taking of medication.  
Although the issue has been raised previously in the literature,42 this was judicially 
considered for the first time in State of Queensland v B where Wilson J concluded that 
section 282 was not applicable because there was no surgery involved in the 
                                                 
41 Marion’s case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 232 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
42 C de Costa and N de Costa, ‘Medical Abortion and the Law’ (2006) 29 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 218, 220; H Douglas, ‘Abortion reform: A state crime or woman’s right to 
choose?’ (2009) 33 Criminal Law Journal 74, 79. 
 
 
termination.43  What then are the implications for the lawfulness of medical 
terminations if this excuse does not apply?  What, if anything, makes medical 
terminations lawful? 
 
Another specific provision in the Code 
 
One possibility is that there may be another provision in the Criminal Code (Qld) that 
makes medical terminations lawful in certain circumstances.  This was the approach 
taken in State of Queensland v B.  As noted above, Wilson J relied on section 286, 
which imposes a duty to safeguard a child under 16 from harm on a person who has 
care of that child. Justice Wilson concluded that the administration of the drug would 
be reasonable within the meaning of this provision and so the existence of this duty 
meant that the termination would not be unlawful.  That provision, however, only 
applies to children under 16 and so would not be otherwise available.  What then in 
those other cases?   
 
The authors have reviewed the duty provisions of the Code and consider two other 
provisions could possibly apply: sections 285 and 290.  Section 285 imposes a duty 
on a person to provide the ‘necessaries of life’ to another who is in his or her charge 
and ‘who is unable by reasons of age, sickness, unsoundness of mind, detention, or 
any other cause, to withdraw from such charge, and who is unable to provide himself 
or herself with the necessaries of life’.  Section 290 imposes a duty on a person who 
‘undertakes to do any act the omission to do which is or may be dangerous to human 
life or health’.  If it could be argued that a medical termination in the particular 
circumstances could meet either of these criteria, a similar approach may be taken to 
State of Queensland v B and criminal responsibility excluded on the basis of a duty 
provision.  This argument is, however, speculative as the authors are not aware of 
these two provisions ever being used in this way.44 
 
Not ‘unlawfully’: common law defence of necessity 
 
Another possibility is that the common law approach as first stated in Davidson could 
be applied to excuse medical terminations.  Sections 224, 225 and 226 all make 
certain acts offences if they are done ‘unlawfully’ and it was this qualification that 
permitted Menhennitt J in Davidson to conclude that if justified by the common law 
defence of necessity then a termination could be lawful.   
 
                                                 
43 [2008] QSC 231, [21].  Despite this decision, it has been suggested that section 282 could be 
interpreted widely so that a reference to ‘surgical operation’ could include a medical termination with 
reliance being placed on either the ‘purposive’ or ‘always speaking’ approaches to statutory 
interpretation: H Douglas, ‘Abortion reform: A state crime or woman’s right to choose?’ (2009) 33 
Criminal Law Journal 74, 81-82.  However, as Douglas acknowledges, the principal obstacle to these 
arguments is that the relevant offence provisions already contemplate terminations through non-
surgical means; for example, section 224 refers to ‘administers to her or causes her to take any poison 
or other noxious thing’: 82.  The authors consider that in light of this, and the significant distortion of 
meaning that would be required for ‘surgical operation’ to include the taking of medication, that the 
interpretation of Wilson J in State of Queensland v B is likely to be accepted.  
44 Indeed the authors are only aware of the duty provisions being used in this way in two cases. The 
first was State of Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454, where the Supreme Court authorised an 
operation to separate conjoined twins that would lead to the death of one of the twins.  The second case 
is the present decision being considered: State of Queensland v B [2008] QSC 231. 
 
 
It is suggested, however, that such an approach would not be permissible in 
Queensland.  Because the criminal law is governed by a Code, a reference to 
‘unlawfully’ would not permit the wholesale importation of the common law defence 
of necessity.45  Although section 282 (dealing with surgical terminations) has been 
interpreted to be consistent with that common law position, that approach has been 
criticised.46  That is also a far less significant step than incorporating a common law 
doctrine to operate within the Code but without it being attached or referable to a 
specific provision, as is being mooted here.  As such, this argument is unlikely to be 
accepted. 
 
Not ‘unlawfully’: lawful prescription  
 
An alternative argument based on the reference to ‘unlawfully’ has been mounted that 
where the Therapeutic Goods Administration ‘has approved use of a drug, 
prescription of that drug is lawful in Queensland pursuant to the Health (Drugs and 
Poisons) Regulation 1996 (Qld)’.47  In other words, the lawfulness of the action 
derives from the legal authority to prescribe the drug granted by the Therapeutic 
Goods Administration and this is sufficient to displace criminal responsibility.  It 
appears this was the position adopted by the Queensland Government after advice 
from the Solicitor-General.48  However, this view has not been tested nor was it 
considered or endorsed by Wilson J in State of Queensland v B.  Further, if this view 
is correct, then is there a need to meet the Davidson test set out above as adopted in 
section 282?  It would appear not and this would lead to different legal tests 
depending on whether the termination was undertaken surgically or medically.49 
 
Conclusion 
 
The decision of State of Queensland v B raises problems in the law of consent and the 
criminal law.  Some of the problems stem from the judgment itself; others arise from 
what the decision reveals about the existing state of the law. 
 
                                                 
45 In State of Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454, Chesterman J stated that the doctrine of necessity 
is ‘a creature of the common law and finds only a very limited role in the Code’: [17].  See also Ward v 
R [1972] WAR 36, where it was held that the Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) required that unless 
common law doctrines are expressly adopted, the Code should not be construed with an assumption 
that they still apply.  This position was cited with approval in Roberts v State of Western Australia 
(2007) 34 WAR 1, [108].  See also RS O’Regan, ‘Surgery and Criminal Responsibility under the 
Queensland Criminal Code’ (1990) 14 Criminal Law Journal 73, 81 which states that Queensland does 
not have common law defences. 
46 See n 34 above. 
47 C de Costa and N de Costa, ‘Medical Abortion and the Law’ (2006) 29 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 218, 220.  See also Joint Statement by the Premier and Attorney-General of 
Queensland, ‘Queensland Doctors and the Prescription of RU486’, 24 April 2006, available at 
http://statements.cabinet.qld.gov.au/MMS/StatementDisplaySingle.aspx?id=45774.  
48 C de Costa and N de Costa, ‘Medical Abortion and the Law’ (2006) 29 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 218, 220. 
49 C de Costa, M Carrette and D Russell, ‘Why abortion law reform is also needed in Queensland’ 
Crikey Online, 22 January 2008, available at http://www.crikey.com.au/2008/01/22/why-abortion-law-
reform-is-also-needed-in-queensland/.  For a discussion of the legal requirements of the Therapeutic 
Goods Administration in terms of being able to use the abortifacient mifepristone (RU486) as an 
‘authorised prescriber’ see: C de Costa, D Russell, N de Costa, M Carrett and H McNamee, ‘Early 
medical abortion in Cairns, Queensland June 2006 – April 2007’ (2007) 187 Medical Journal of 
Australia 171.  
 
 
In terms of consent, the authors have argued against the conclusion that a termination 
of pregnancy for a non-Gillick competent minor requires court approval and cannot be 
consented to by parents.  The requirement to obtain court approval has been imposed 
in a very limited category of cases all of which share particular features.  A closer 
analysis of terminations reveals that those features are not present in the same way in 
decisions of that type.  While a termination of pregnancy is a very serious matter, the 
nature of the decision is not such as to deprive parents of the ability to provide 
consent in their child’s best interests. 
 
Accordingly, it is argued that State of Queensland v B should not be followed.  As a 
decision of a single Judge of the Supreme Court, it does not bind other members of 
that Court.  Nevertheless, individuals including parents and doctors who are 
considering a termination in these circumstances may be concerned as to the 
lawfulness of doing so without court approval.  It may be prudent, unless and until the 
matter is reconsidered by the Supreme Court, that court approval be obtained prior to 
such a termination occurring. 
 
In relation to the criminal law, the above analysis reveals that the law governing 
terminations in Queensland is inconsistent and uncertain.  In relation to terminations 
for children, the different legal positions discussed above that operate depending on 
the characteristics of the child involved are illogical.  An abortion which is legal a 
week before a child’s 16th birthday should not then be unlawful a fortnight later when 
section 286 of the Criminal Code (Qld) is no longer available. 
 
Nor can the ongoing uncertainty as to the lawfulness of medical terminations be 
justified.  None of the arguments advanced above as to why medical terminations may 
be lawful are compelling and it is unsatisfactory that this uncertainty remains.  Calls 
for reform of the law of abortion have been made for some time.50  The problems 
revealed by State of Queensland v B and the analysis undertaken here demonstrates 
further the urgent need for law reform in this area. 
                                                 
50 See for example, L de Crespigny and J Savulescu, ‘Abortion: time to clarify Australia’s confusing 
laws’ (2004) 181 Medical Journal of Australia 201; C de Costa and N de Costa, ‘Medical Abortion and 
the Law’ (2006) 29 University of New South Wales Law Journal 218; H Douglas, ‘Abortion reform: A 
state crime or woman’s right to choose?’ (2009) 33 Criminal Law Journal 74, 86. In Queensland, see 
also Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code, Report of the Taskforce on Women and the Criminal 
Code (1999), 366.  
